Expectations of Privacy in Social Media by Henderson, Stephen E.
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 2 Vol. 31 Iss. 2 Article 3 
2013 
Expectations of Privacy in Social Media 
Stephen E. Henderson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
31 Miss. C. L. Rev. 227 (2012-2013) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN SOCIAL MEDIA
Stephen E. Henderson*
This Article, which largely tracks my remarks at the Mississippi Col-
lege School of Law Social Media Symposium, examines expectations of pri-
vacy in social media such as weblogs (blogs), Facebook pages, and Twitter
tweets. Social media is diverse and ever diversifying, and while I address
some of that complexity, I focus on the core functionality, which provides
the groundwork for further conversation as the technology and related so-
cial norms develop. As one would expect, just as with our offline commu-
nications and other online communications, in some we have an
expectation of privacy that is recognized by current law, in some we have
an expectation of privacy that should be recognized by current law, and in
some we have no legitimate expectation of privacy. The Article begins
with a short (and personal) history of social media and then discusses the
theory of information privacy, after which follows an explanation of, and
then application of, the governing constitutional law. This is an area in
which statutes should, and to some extent do, expand upon the constitu-
tional floor, and the Article ends with a consideration of those statutes and
needs for improvements therein, including via statutory frameworks like
that recently adopted by the American Bar Association.
I. A BRIEF (AND PERSONAL) HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
For most of my life, I suppose I have been a relatively early adopter of
computer technology, and because my personal history is relevant to that
of social media and provides a bit of perspective and color, I comment
briefly upon it here. If you are a reader who could not care less, however,
you can safely skip this introduction and move immediately to the next
section introducing information privacy.
I was nine years old when my father, a physicist at a national labora-
tory, purchased our first home computer. The Heathkit/Zenith Z-100 cost
an outrageous sum compared to computers today, but I was dutifully im-
pressed with its three-color display on which he programmed a card match-
ing game in Z-Basic, and on which I began programming more ballistic
alternatives.' Of course, nine seems positively old compared to my two-
year-old son taking to my BlackBerry and iPad, but just as school used to
* Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma College of Law. Yale Law School (J.D.,
1999); University of California at Davis (B.S., 1995). I am grateful to the Mississippi College Law
Review, and in particular to Editor-in-Chief Justin Ponds, for the invitation to participate in the Social
Media Symposium and for the exceptional hospitality during that event.
1. For information on the Heathkit system, see Herb Johnson, Intro to Heath/Zenith Z-100 Sys-
tems, RETROTECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.retrotechnology.com/herbsstufflzlOO.html (last updated
Aug. 30, 2011); Heathkir/Zenith Z-100/110/120, OLD-COMPUTERS.COM, http://www.old-computers.com/
museum/computer.asp?c=261 (last visited May 15, 2012).
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be uphill both ways, in my youth it was hard work to make a computer do
something fun.
Indeed, at times it was work to make a computer function at all. When
I was fourteen and programming for my Pascal course, it could be a bit
noisy. The fan on my dad's "laptop," an orange-screened Toshiba T3100,
had failed, and so we resorted to using the fan from a hair blow dryer to
cool the computer.2 It is hard to imagine similarly resuscitating an elec-
tronic device in today's "replace it" culture. The following summer, I was
programming as New Mexico's representative at the Department of En-
ergy's High School Science Student Honors Program in Supercomputing,
and I have a wonderful picture of myself as a young-looking fifteen-year-
old leaning on a Cray-2 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
outrageously loud shorts and a t-shirt. The processing power of that com-
puter is now matched by that of an iPad 2," but it was the fastest computer
in the world between 1985 and 1990.4 That same summer I began program-
ming fluid flow simulations at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Fortran
on networks of Sun computers, and also began to participate in social
media.
Of course, the social media of the 1980s and early 1990s-known as
Bulletin Board Systems (BBSes)-bears little resemblance to the social
media of today.' Because the network connections, topping out with 28.8
thousand bit-per-second modems, were thousands, or tens of thousands,
times slower than those we currently enjoy, the purpose was not to
download significant content. But like the modern fare, BBSes allowed
interactive online dialogue and entertainment. There were good jokes
posted on the local BBS humor message board and a respectable multi-
user text game in which you were permitted one move a day, and I was
duly impressed with the graphics some folks created using only ASCII
characters.6 1, not being so creative, just stole someone's Bart Simpson
likeness as my own signature, foreshadowing in a microcosm the "sharing"
that would come with the World Wide Web (hereinafter "WWW").
During college I interacted with the nascent WWW, which we ac-
cessed via the first browser. Called Mosaic, it was the forerunner of today's
2. For information on the Toshiba system, see T3100 Series, OLD-COMPUTERS.COM, http://www.
old-computers.com/museum/doc.asp?c=917&st=1 (last visited May 15, 2012); Toshiba T-Series T3100,
TOSHIBA-EUROPE.COM, http://www.toshiba-europe.com/bv/computers/products/notebooks/t3100/index.
shtm (last visited May 15, 2012).
3. See John Markoff, The iPad in Your Hand: As Fast as a Supercomputer of Yore, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-ipad-in-your-hand-as-fast-as-a-
supercomputer-of-yore/.
4. See Cray-2, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCray-2.
5. For more information, see Bulletin Board Systems, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikilBulletin_board-system (last updated June 12, 2012).
6. ASCII stands for American Standard Code for Information Interchange, and includes
ninety-five printable characters that one would expect to find on a computer keyboard. See ASCII,
WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilASCII.
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Firefox, Internet Explorer, Safari, and their kin.' And then came the hey-
day of America Online, and there were the first massively multiplayer
games in MUDs and MOOs.' So I suppose my reliance upon computers
and computer networking has been gradual, but today, I-like most of us-
am an addict. I rely heavily upon the Internet for communication, for
learning, for banking and other commerce, and for entertainment. I still
love the feel of a paper book but also love being able to look up words with
a single tap and to quickly explore their derivation and nuance. And it is
hard to imagine consulting a paper encyclopedia or dictionary. I expect my
dictionary to be able to speak to me, so I can get by without ever learning
just how an upside-down "e" is to be pronounced.
Not only does this establish that online social media is not quite as new
as it might seem, but, hopefully, that I have a little bit of geek credibility.
Not as much as some, of course, but nor am I a Johnny-come-lately when it
comes to communications and interactions via computer networks. Unfor-
tunately, that is where my "good news" ends. I do not post any pictures to
flickr. I do not have videos on YouTube. I lack a profile on LinkedIn. I do
not blog. I do not tweet. Most distressing, perhaps, is that it was not until
being invited to participate in a social media symposium that I finally
joined the 845 million of you who have a Facebook page.9 And even then,
being a privacy nut I immediately turned off most all of the features, so I
cannot claim the full experience. So I am fairly conversant with, but not a
full participant in, social media."o But hopefully being conversant, and hav-
ing spent considerable time in the last ten years thinking about privacy,
merits something to say.
II. INFORMATION PRIVACY
There is some presumably small segment of society that at least claims
not to care for privacy, perhaps best represented by Scott McNealy's fa-
mous (or infamous) words: "You already have zero privacy-get over it.""
7. See Mosaic (web browser), WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMo-
saic_(web browser) (last updated May 30, 2012).
8. See MUD, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMUD (last updated May 15, 2012);
see also MOO, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMOO (last updated June 16, 2012).
9. See The Value of Friendship, THE ECoNoMIsT, Feb. 4, 2012, at 23. As THE ECONOMIST
points out, were Facebook a country, it would be the world's third most populous, behind only China
and India. Id. It is astounding that fully one seventh of the world's population could soon be on
Facebook. Its usage statistics are similarly impressive: "Every day 250m photos are uploaded to the
site. One out of every seven minutes spent online is on Facebook, according to comScore, a research
firm." Id.
10. According to a recent survey of more than 1,000 pregnant women, over half planned to re-
cord the birth via social media as it takes place. See Heidi Stevens, Social Media Giving Birth to New
Generation of Parents-to-Be, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 2011, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/-
28//fam-1227-pregnant-trend-20111227 1_social-media-social-networking-healthy-pregnancy. A part of
me has to wonder how many of them have given birth before, because there are things said in the
delivery room that are best left in the delivery room. In all seriousness, whatever the merits, tweeting a
birth just is not my world.
11. Jeffrey Rosen, The Eroded Self, N.Y. TIMEs, April 30, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/library/magazine/home/20000430mag-internetprivacy.html.
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And there is some segment of commerce that seems to regularly disrespect
privacy, perhaps best captured by Conan O'Brien's December 7, 2011, dig
at Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg: "Someone hacked into
Facebook and leaked Mark Zuckerberg's private photos. When Zuck-
erberg realized someone had showed a blatant disregard for his privacy, he
hired them." 1 2 But for most, privacy is an important value, and that has
been true historically, at least in representative governments.
Studies by Alan Westin have confirmed a relationship between politi-
cal philosophy and privacy throughout Western civilization:
In classic or contemporary authoritarian societies, where
public life is celebrated as the highest good and the fulfill-
ment of the individual's purpose on earth, the concept of
legally or socially protected privacy for individuals, families,
social groups, and private associations is rejected as hedon-
istic and immoral. It is also seen as politically dangerous to
the regime. Thus traditional authoritarian societies create
procedures to watch and listen secretly to elite groups, and
modern totalitarian governments keep extensive records on
individuals, families, and all associational activities.
In contrast, both classic republics and modern democracies
regard the private sector as a valuable force for social pro-
gress and morality and thereby seek to foster individualism
and freedom of association. In the modern constitutional
democracies, the public order, government, is seen as a use-
ful and necessary mechanism for providing services and pro-
tection; but constitutional governments are expressly barred
by bills of rights and other guarantees of civil liberty from
interfering with the citizen's private beliefs, associations,
and acts, except in extraordinary situations and then only
through controlled procedures.1 3
12. The Best of Late Nite Jokes, NEWSMAX.COM, (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.newsmax.com/Jokes/
644.
13. Alan F. Westin, Historical Perspectives on Privacy: From the Hebrews and Greeks to the
American Republic 4-5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (presented and distributed at
the 2009 Privacy Law Scholars Conference and quoted with permission). Westin later summarizes as
follows:
In the authoritarian tradition-exemplified by Sparta, the Roman Empire, 17-19th century
European nation-state monarchies, and contemporary dictatorships-the exercise of extensive
powers to compel disclosure and to conduct population-wide surveillance has been and re-
mains an essential part of the political culture and governmental system.
By contrast, in what I would call the constitutional tradition-typified by the Hebrews, Peri-
clean Athens, the Roman Republic, the English parliamentary system, the American republic,
and modern democratic nations-basic limits were and are placed on the powers of authorities
to put individuals or groups under surveillance or to compel extensive disclosure of 'sensitive'
personal information. . ..
... [I]t is fair to say that no political system with a reputation for liberty in its time failed to
provide important legal and social limits on surveillance by authorities. And, no regime that is
judged to have been authoritarian and despotic failed to deploy forces of surveillance and
enforced disclosure as regular instruments of state, or fails to do so today.
230 [VOL. 31:227
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Similarly, privacy scholar Daniel Solove concludes that "[p]eople have
cared about privacy since antiquity."14
As for America, Westin identifies the Republic of 1790-1820 as "the
first 'modern' privacy system":
Of course, the word "privacy" does not appear in the U.S.
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. However, the Founding
Fathers gave the American Republic all the key components
of a broad-scale privacy regime-fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure;
rejection of compulsory testimony and self-incrimination;
and privacy for association and religion in the First Amend-
ment. Privacy rights in first-class mail and in Census enu-
meration were written into early federal legislation or
regulation, and the privacy of letters was given judicial pro-
tection against private publication against the wishes of the
writer or recipient. And, by rejecting internal government
passports, elaborate government record-keeping, govern-
ment spy networks, and other apparatuses of late 18th and
early 19th century royal surveillance, the American republic
nurtured socio-political traditions of individual autonomy
and non-surveillance that gave daily vitality to the early
constitutional and legal rules."
The First Amendment's freedom of speech protects privacy in the
form of anonymous speech,16 and the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Bill of Rights to include substantive due process protection for private de-
cisions." A number of state constitutions explicitly protect privacy." And
the law has not been stagnant but instead in every category has adapted to
the changing circumstances of over two hundred years.
Nonetheless, it can be difficult to define privacy, at least in part be-
cause we use the one term to describe multiple values. 19 There is surely a
difference between the right of bodily autonomy on the one hand, and the
right to private communications on the other, yet both are often described
as rights of "privacy." When we are discussing social networking, we are
Id. at 9.
14. DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING To HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECUR-
rry 4 (2011).
15. Westin, supra note 13, at 9-10.
16. See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing marital privacy);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing information privacy).
18. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
19. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand David
Schoeman ed., 1984); DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 35-36
(2006); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
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not directly interested in bodily autonomy (what might be termed "decision
privacy"); we are interested in "information privacy." But even with infor-
mation privacy there are competing notions and definitions, and some ar-
gue it is impossible to encapsulate the right in any single formulation. 20 If
so, perhaps privacy is essentially contested-most everyone agrees that we
should have it, but has different ideas of just what it is. For the most part,
however, I think the right to information privacy can be encapsulated by
the ability to control what information about you is conveyed to others and
for what purposes.
Such a "control" notion of information privacy is widely associated
with Westin, whose seminal 1967 work defines privacy as "the claim of indi-
viduals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others." 2 1 Sim-
ilarly, Charles Fried described privacy as "that aspect of social order by
which persons control access to information about themselves." 22 One of
the key themes in Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's seminal 1890 arti-
cle was an individual's "right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others." 23 So
I consider information privacy the right to control what information about
you is conveyed to others and for what purposes.
Andrew Taslitz has explained why this control matters:
Identity is complex; different circumstances reveal different
aspects of our nature. Each of us wears many masks
wherein each mask reflects a different aspect of who we re-
ally are. We do not want our entire natures to be judged by
any one mask, nor do we want partial revelations of our ac-
tivities to define us in a particular situation as other than
who we want to be. In short, we want to choose the masks
that we show to others; any such loss of choice is painful,
amounting almost to a physical violation of the self. When
we are secretly watched, or when information that we
choose to reveal to one audience is instead exposed to an-
other, we lose that sense of choice.24
Similarly, Benjamin Goold explains as follows:
20. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 24 ("Privacy ... is too complex a concept to be reduced to
a singular essence. It is a plurality of different things that do not share one element in common but that
nevertheless bear a resemblance to each other.").
21. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). A Westlaw search for the latter half of
Westin's quotation (beginning with "to determine for themselves") in the "allcases" database shows it
has been relied upon in over thirty court decisions, including decisions by supreme courts. E.g., U.S.
Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764, n.16 (1989); Shaktman v.
State, 553 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1989).
22. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968).
23. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 198
(1890).
24. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy,
and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 125, 131 (2002).
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Although it is possible to talk of privacy as simply the right
to be "let alone," its status as a right derives primarily from
its relationship to ideas of autonomy and self-determination.
Privacy is valuable because it is necessary for the proper de-
velopment of the self, the establishment and control of per-
sonal identity, and the maintenance of individual dignity.
Without privacy, it not only becomes harder to form valua-
ble social relationships - relationships based on exclusivity,
intimacy, and the sharing of personal information - but also
to maintain a variety of social roles and identities. Privacy
deserves to be protected as a right because we need it in
order to live rich, fulfilling lives, lives where we can simulta-
neously play the role of friend, colleague, parent and citizen
without having the boundaries between these different and
often conflicting identities breached without our consent.25
So information privacy is fundamental to our personhood. In the
words of information security specialist Bruce Schneier, "Privacy is an in-
herent human right, and a requirement for maintaining the human condi-
tion with dignity and respect."2 6 We develop as mature human beings by
having many different zones of privacy: some thoughts we experiment
upon only by ourselves, some we share only with spouses or very close
confederates, some we share with church congregants, some with profes-
sional colleagues. Because who we are is a complex amalgamation of all of
these different "masks," to use Taslitz's term, it is a very real harm to our
personhood when this structure is betrayed. Information conveyed to an
unintended recipient does not enjoy the context it would have with an in-
tended recipient and thus is likely to be misunderstood or misconceived.
Information privacy is therefore an important right, and the pithy "if you
have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear" is deeply flawed.2 7 And
privacy is not extinguished by the sharing of information with select others,
as privacy is not secrecy. In the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, "Pri-
vacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all." 2 8 In-
stead, the divisible nature of privacy is fundamental to its worth.
25. Benjamin Goold, Surveillance and the Political Value of Privacy, 1 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 3,
3-4 (2009).
26. Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy,WIRED.COM, (May 18, 2006), http://www.wired.
com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886/. Schneier continues:
For if we are observed in all matters, we are constantly under threat of correction, judgment,
criticism, even plagiarism of our own uniqueness. We become children, fettered under watch-
ful eyes, constantly fearful that-either now or in the uncertain future-patterns we leave
behind will be brought back to implicate us, by whatever authority has now become focused
upon our once-private and innocent acts. We lose our individuality, because everything we do
is observable and recordable.
Id.
27. See SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 21-32.
28. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Lewis R.
Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564-66 (1990)
(explaining this concept); Burrows v. Super. Ct., 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974) (applying the concept to
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Although perhaps not essential to the current project of examining
privacy in social media, it is worth noting a common mistake, which is to
consider "privacy versus security." This false dichotomy presents a unitary
dial: if we turn up privacy, we get less security, and if we turn down privacy,
we get more security.2 9 Security and privacy are viewed as a zero-sum
tradeoff. In the both humorous and telling words of Daniel Solove, this
false dichotomy has become so ingrained "that people seem to associate
being inconvenienced and being intruded upon with security. So if the gov-
ernment wants to make people feel more secure, all it needs to do is make
them feel more uncomfortable and exposed."30
Bruce Schneier is a frequent critic of such "security theater,""1 and he
corrects this misperception: "Too many [people] wrongly characterize the
debate as 'security versus privacy.' . . . Liberty requires security without
intrusion, security plus privacy."3 In other words, there is no doubt that
there is a relation between security and privacy, in that a change to one will
sometimes affect the other.3 3 But sometimes it is possible to increase se-
curity without decreasing privacy, and sometimes a decrease to privacy
leads to no meaningful increase in security. Our goal as a nation has al-
ways been not merely to be safe, but to be secure, and such security re-
quires both safety and privacy. Thus, perhaps in this context it is most
helpful to articulate that safety and privacy are related and can affect one
another, but security requires an ample measure of both.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA
There is no doubt that law enforcement finds relevant some of what
we do online. The Electronic Privacy Information Center, or EPIC, has
obtained information on a Department of Homeland Security initiative
that would monitor social media, gathering information from "online fo-
rums, blogs, public websites, and messages boards" and disseminating it to
"federal, state, local, and foreign government and private sector part-
ners."3 4 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has solicited proposals for
recognize privacy in a bank account); People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (same);
State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 874 (N.J. 2005) (same); People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 67 (Cal.
1984) (applying the concept to recognize privacy in telephone dialing information); People v. Sporleder,
666 P.2d 135, 141 (Colo. 1983) (same); People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(same); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955-56 (N.J. 1982) (same); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1117
(Wash. 1990) (applying the concept to recognize privacy in trash collection); State v. Morris, 680 A.2d
90, 95 (Vt. 1996) (same).
29. I believe it may have been from Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center, that I first heard this precise analogy.
30. SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 35.
31. See Bruce Schneier, Beyond Security Theater, 427 NEW INTERNATIONALIST 10 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/11/beyond-security.html.
32. Schneier, supra note 26.
33. In the words of the Eleventh Circuit, "[Tjhe Fourth Amendment embodies a value judgment
by the Framers that prevents us from gradually trading ever-increasing amounts of freedom and privacy
for additional security." Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004).
34. EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security: Media Monitoring, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/foial
epic-v-dhs-media-monitoring/default.html (last visited May 15, 2012).
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developing a similar system." While perhaps merely the twenty-first cen-
tury equivalent of the national security traffic analysis that has long taken
place in communications networks, some will see echoes of THE ONION'S
humorous proposition that Facebook was a CIA creation.36
More specifically (and seriously), Google's "Transparency Report"
chronicles how many data requests Google receives from government
agencies and courts around the world." In the first half of 2011, there were
5,950 American criminal justice requests for user data relating to 11,057
accounts, and Google complied with these requests 93% of the time." So
that is some 12,000 requests per year, or thiry-two per day, to this single-
albeit enormous-online provider, and this does not include those requests
made pursuant to a National Security Letter or Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act court order.
Such law enforcement requests are potentially governed by the Fourth
Amendment, which provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."40 As
Jed Rubenfeld has argued, that specific language-that we have a right to
be secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects-is indeed perhaps a
particularly good way to describe the right, because government surveil-
lance and other acquisition of information affects our sense of security.4 1
But when the Supreme Court looks to whether there has been a search or
seizure it does not define either by notions of "security."
The Court recently reaffirmed that there are two tests for what consti-
tutes a search. The first is when "[t]he Government physically occupie[s]
private property for the purpose of obtaining information."42 Thus, the
Fourth Amendment regulates police installation of a GPS device on a tar-
get's vehicle in order to track its movements,4 3 and it would regulate the
search of a target's computer. The second conception-relevant to ob-
taining information from a social media provider-is government conduct
35. See Jim Giles, FBI Releases Plans to Monitor Social Networks, NEWSCIENTIST, (Jan. 25,
2012), http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2012/01/fbi-releases-plans-to-monitor.html.
36. See CIA's 'Facebook' Program Dramatically Cut Agency's Costs, THEONION.COM, http://www.
theonion.com/video/cias-facebook-program-dramatically-cut-agencys-cos,19753/ (last visited May 15,
2012). In case you are wondering, Agent Mark Zuckerberg's codename is "The Overlord."
37. Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ (last visited May
15, 2012).
38. Transparency Report: United States, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
userdatarequests/ (last visited May 15, 2012).
39. See Ryan Singel, U.S. Requests for Google User Data Spike 29 Percent in Six Months,
wIRED.COM, (Oct. 25, 2011 11:07 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/google-data-requests
(noting the report's limitations).
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
41. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 119-122 (2008).
42. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
43. See id.
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that intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.44 There is much
about this second definition that remains poorly defined,4 5 but for our pur-
poses there is instructive case law, as explained below.
The Court has also applied two conceptions of seizure. But unlike
those for search, which can be seen as complementary, Paul Ohm has de-
veloped the contradiction in the Court's two lines of seizure jurispru-
dence.4 6 In a series of eavesdropping cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the
Court repeatedly asserted, essentially without analysis, that the capture of
intangible communications constitutes both a Fourth Amendment search
and seizure. First, in the false-friend case of Hoffa v. United States, the
Court concluded that "the protections of the Fourth Amendment are surely
not limited to tangibles, but can extend to oral statements."4 7 But because
it resolved the case on what would become the infamous third party doc-
trine, the Hoffa Court did not distinguish between search and seizure of
such intangibles.4 8
The next year, in Katz v. United States, the Court held that recording
one end of a telephone call implicates both rights.49 But although the
Court labeled the eavesdropping a "search and seizure" throughout its
opinion, it never explained why seizure was implicated.o That same year,
in Berger v. New York, the Court repeatedly described the capture of tele-
phone conversations as constituting a seizure, again without analysis." Ten
years later, in United States v. New York Telephone Company, the Court
articulated that recording the digits dialed on a telephone constitutes both
a search of the telephone and a seizure of the information so obtained.
However, once again the Court made no justification for this assertion, and
made no attempt to define "seizure.""
44. See id. at 950, 952 ("[A]s we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.").
45. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 517 n.54 (2005) [hereinafter Nothing
New] (noting the Court's waffling between normative and empirical notions).
46. See Paul Ohm, The Olmsteadian Seizure Clause: The Fourth Amendment and the Seizure of
Intangible Property, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 17-31(2008).
47. 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).
48. See id. at 302-03; Nothing New, supra note 45, at 518-20.
49. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and re-
cording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
50. See id. at 354-57. This lack of explanation is not too surprising when one considers that the
entire Katz majority opinion is essentially devoid of careful legal analysis. It is from Justice Harlan's
concurrence that we derive a legal standard, namely the "reasonable expectation of privacy criterion"
for what constitutes a search. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967).
52. 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977) ("[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)] is broad enough to
encompass a 'search' designed to ascertain the use which is being made of a telephone suspected of
being employed as a means of facilitating a criminal venture and the 'seizure' of evidence which the
'search' of the telephone produces.").
53. Instead, the Court limited itself to explaining why a Rule of Criminal Procedure authorizing
a warrant to "search for and seize any ... property" is broad enough to permit a warrant authorizing a
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It is easy to see why the interception of private communications consti-
tutes a search under the modern reasonable expectation of privacy frame-
work: both empirically and normatively, persons have an expectation of
privacy in their conversations, and when the government surreptitiously ac-
cesses those conversations, it invades that reasonable expectation. But
while the Supreme Court interception cases consistently also label the re-
cording a seizure, there is no meaningful consideration of why that is the
case. Instead, in every opinion the Court focused solely on determining
whether the government could undertake the challenged conduct which it
had so quickly labeled a "search and seizure."
The modern definition of seizure is typically associated with United
States v. Jacobsen, in which the Court defined a seizure as "some meaning-
ful interference with an individual's possessory interest" in property.54 At
first glance, this might seem in conflict with the eavesdropping cases, as
listening in upon a conversation or discovering the telephone digits dialed
does not interfere with the conversants' possession of that information.
The Supreme Court, without acknowledging the eavesdropping cases, took
just such a view in Arizona v. Hicks."
In Hicks, officers executing an emergency aid search of a home picked
up stereo equipment and recorded the serial numbers thereon.5 6 Although
the Court determined that such movement did constitute a Fourth Amend-
ment search, it concluded that recording the serial numbers was no seizure:
We agree [with the government] that the mere recording of
the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure. To be sure,
that was the first step in a process by which respondent was
eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of it-
self, however, it did not "meaningfully interfere" with re-
spondent's possessory interest in either the serial numbers
or the equipment, and therefore did not amount to a
seizure.
Not only does this fail to address the contrary view in the eavesdrop-
ping cases, but it assumes a narrow definition of "possession." It may be
that "[i]n the whole range of legal theory there is no conception more diffi-
cult than that of possession,",5 but the first two definitions in Black's law
dictionary are as follows:
1. The fact of having or holding property in one's power; the
exercise of dominion over property.
pen register. Id. at 170 ("Rule 41 is sufficiently broad to include seizures of intangible items such as dial
impulses recorded by pen registers as well as tangible items.").
54. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
55. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
56. Id. at 323.
57. Id. at 324.
58. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
285 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)).
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2. The right under which one may exercise control over
something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing ex-
ercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object.59
The concept of "dominion" and "exclusive control" are just as relevant
to intangible things as to tangible. Indeed, as explained above, the entire
notion of information privacy arguably rests on the right and ability to con-
trol information. Thus, if the government obtains information that was
previously in one's exclusive control, it seems it has meaningfully interfered
with a possessory interest. It is unclear, however, whether the Court will so
recognize.
Whatever the precise definitions of search and seizure, the Court has
articulated this general principle:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.60
This limitation makes eminent sense, in that police should not have to
be the only ones to avert their eyes. If you tape a message on a window
visible from the street, or place a pie to cool or a plant to grow there, a
police officer driving or walking by is free to give it a look. According to
the control theory of information privacy, you have chosen to share that
information. Whereas if you carry any of those items on your person in
public, but in an opaque container, the item remains private, and police
must act accordingly.
Some social media is exposed to the public, such as an open-to-the-
world blog. It is not reasonable to expect privacy when one publishes
something to all comers. So there would be no Fourth Amendment re-
straint on police obtaining the content of such a blog, either by bringing up
the site themselves or via the third party hosting that content.6 ' The same
holds true for a Facebook wall which the user leaves open to the public,
YouTube videos left open to the public, and flickr pictures left open to the
public. And the same holds true for tweets from a public account, meaning
one for which the user does not restrict followers. Since any private person
can obtain these things without restraint, the police can as well.62
59. Id.
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
61. See United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in personal computer files accessible to anyone using the peer-to-peer file trading
network); United States v. Gines-Perez. 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 224-26 (D.P.R. 2002) (finding no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in a photograph available on a publicly accessible website).
62. Because such information is already public, there can similarly be no civil liability for republi-
cation under the privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc.,
172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1129-30 (2009). On the other hand, if private information is placed online in
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On the other end of the spectrum, there are functions on social media
sites that are the antithesis of public, meaning it is immediately apparent
that one retains a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example,
Facebook messages, in which one user communicates directly with another,
are either analogous to a telephone conversation if in real time, or are anal-
ogous to e-mail and postal mail if asynchronous.' We retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in telephone conversations,65 postal letters,66 and e-
mail, and thus similarly retain an expectation of privacy in these
messages. 8 Of course, once a physical letter is received, it is the recipient's
expectation of privacy that becomes relevant, and no longer the sender's. 69
But as to a copy retained by an intermediary such as a social media service
provider, both the sender and recipient should retain a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. If anything, a service provider's legitimate interest in a
message decreases once it has reached its intended destination, as that
transmission was the sole purpose of the bailment.
Thus, we have two poles: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
for public posts, but there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and in-
deed a warrant requirement, for instant messaging and e-mail. What of
information "between" these poles? We can classify that information into
three categories. There is "subscriber information," which the social media
provider requires in order to provide any service. This would include iden-
tifying information (subscriber name, contact information, method of pay-
ment, and screen name), account type, and the length of service. There is
"transactional information," which the social media provider requires to
facilitate desired communications. Transactional information would in-
clude to whom a subscriber communicates, and when, thus including a list
of Facebook friends. Finally, there are "non-public communications," such
such a public format, it can constitute that tort even if not many persons actually peruse it. See Yath v.
Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 42-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
63. One could argue these functions are not, therefore, social media, but they are popular func-
tions on some social media sites and therefore deserving of consideration.
64. See Privacy for Messages, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=1680442699233
34 (last visited May 15, 2012) ("[Y]our conversations within Facebook [Messages] are absolutely pri-
vate. Only you and the person you're messaging can view the contents and history of your conversa-
tion, and stories about your messages will never appear in the news feed.").
65. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
66. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (protecting letter via warrant requirement);
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1980) (same where carried by private carrier); United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (same).
67. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285-86 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Given the fundamental
similarities between email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy common sense to
afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection."). A panel of the Eleventh Circuit briefly held to
the contrary but then withdrew that opinion. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281-82 (11th Cir.
2010), vacated, 611 F.3d 828, 846-47 (2010).
68. For a contrary view that does not address my (or others') previous work on the limitations of
the Fourth Amendment third party doctrine, see Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How
the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31
PACE L. REV. 291, 329, 350-51 (2011).
69. See United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995).
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as Facebook wall posts to a limited audience of friends,70 YouTube videos
to a limited audience, flickr pictures to a limited audience,72 and pro-
tected tweets to a limited following." There are of course other features
on Facebook and similar sites, and new ones being developed all of the
time. But many merely provide various means of communicating some
type of information to a limited audience, and thus can be analyzed within
this simplified structure.
In order to determine the Fourth Amendment rule for these categories
we require the so-called third party doctrine, a Supreme Court jurispru-
dence that grew out of a very stingy reading of the Katz language regarding
disclosures to the public.7 4 In a nutshell, "the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and con-
veyed by [the third party] to Government authorities, even if the informa-
tion is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be be-
trayed."7  In other words, you retain no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information you convey to a third party, with respect to the government
obtaining it from that third party. Thus, there is no Fourth Amendment
restriction on law enforcement access to bank records residing with a
bank or to phone dialing records residing with a phone company. I, like
many others, think this doctrine is wrongheaded and especially destructive
given modern social norms and technologies.78  Encouraged by some re-
cent developments, I have already written its obituary.7 9 Most recently,
70. See How Do I Control Who Can See and Post to My Wall, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/help/?faq=163475490382977#How-do-I-control-who-can-see-and-post-to-my-Wall? (last visited
May 15, 2012).
71. See Private Videos and How to Share Them, YouTUBE, http://support.google.com/youtube/
binlanswer.py?hl =en&answer=157177 (last visited May 15, 2012).
72. See Public/Private, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/help/privacy (last visited May 15, 2012).
73. See FAQs About Following, TwITrER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/14019-what-is-fol-
lowing (last visited May 15, 2012); About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITrER, http://sup-
port.twitter.com/articles/14016 (last visited May 15, 2012).
74. See Nothing New, supra note 45, at 518-21; Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty
States: How To Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its States Analogs To Protect Third Party Information
from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 373, 376-79 (2006) [hereinafter Learning].
75. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
76. See id. at 437.
77. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Nothing New, supra note 45, at 521-44; Learning, supra note 74, at 379-86, 390-93;
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 151-64 (2007); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 211 (2006); Russell D.
Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 80 Miss. L.J. 1289 (2011);
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70
MD. L. REV. 681 (2011) [hereinafter Cell Phone Location]; Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Commu-
nications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007) [hereinafter First Principles]; Jack I. Lemer &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the "Long View" On the Fourth Amendment: Stored Records and the
Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2008); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the
Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011);
Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 647 (2011).
79. Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine,
96 IOWA L. REV. 39 (2011) [hereinafter Timely Demise].
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Justice Sotomayor questioned the doctrine in her concurrence in United
States v. Jones."o But unless and until five members of the Supreme Court
so hold, it remains the federal constitutional law, and thus it is necessary to
apply the doctrine to our categories of social media information.
For subscriber information and transactional information, there is no
Fourth Amendment protection.8' Just as with banking records and tele-
phone dialing records, the third party service provider uses this information
in order to provide the desired service, and thus it falls squarely within the
third party doctrine. In order to determine the rule for friend wall posts
and protected tweets, it is helpful to first return to our "protected" end of
the spectrum-Facebook messages. I have asserted that there is a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy by analogy to telephone conversations and pos-
tal mail, but how does this work with the third party doctrine? The Court
has actually never made it clear, but the rule must be what I have termed a
"limited" third party doctrine: one retains no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information provided for a third party's use.82 This is the only way
to reconcile there being no protection for telephone dialing information
(provided for the company's use in facilitating the calls) with there being
protection for telephone conversations (for which the company is a mere
conduit or bailee). Thus, as to friend wall posts, protected tweets, and simi-
larly limited communications, there is a Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy.
But there are further complications. What of information that was
once publicly available but is no longer? A person might post something to
a blog but then later remove it. Or a third party might post something to
its public website but then remove it. According to the third party doc-
trine, law enforcement can access that information without restraint from
any person who read the entry and chooses to reveal its content or who
80. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotamayor, J., concurring).
81. See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail transactional information and in Internet protocol addresses of web-
sites visited); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v.
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
Internet subscriber information); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *3-4
(4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (same); United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007)
(same), vacated on other grounds, 648 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011); State v. Mello, 27 A.3d 771, 775 (N.H.
2011) (same under state constitution). See also United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th
Cir. 2008) (gathering cases and concluding that "[elvery federal court to address this issue has held that
subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's
privacy expectation"). Cf. State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 399 (2008) (holding there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in subscriber information under state constitution).
82. See Nothing New, supra note 45, at 526-27. Courts in other contexts have recognized a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in something left with a bailee. See United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191,
198 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bag left with store clerk); United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1481-84 (8th Cir.
1988) (luggage left with airline); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1979) (brief-
case left with friend).
83. In the context of privacy torts, courts have recognized a privacy interest despite limited dis-
closure to a circle of friends. See Steven D. Zansberg & Janna K. Fischer, Privacy Expectations in
Online Social Media-An Emerging Generational Divide?, 28-Nov COMM. LAw. 1, 28 (2011).
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retained a copy and chooses to hand it over. I agree with this result, be-
cause as Christopher Slobogin and Eugene Volokh have argued, that per-
son has autonomy and free speech interests in choosing to share
information that overrides the possible privacy interests of the original
source.84
What of law enforcement access from an employee of the service pro-
vider who happens to recall its content or-much more likely-who can
obtain it from company records? I think there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in this instance and, therefore, such access should be regulated
by the Fourth Amendment. That something was once public does not nec-
essarily defeat a claim of privacy. To use an analogy, criminal justice
records are public, but when certain records are expunged, they are no
longer publicly available and for good reason." The European Commis-
sion's proposed data protection regulations thus include a "right to be for-
gotten" that would require third parties to assist in the removal of online
information. 8 6 One can imagine an especially strong case for privacy: per-
haps the post was in error and was taken down after only a few seconds,
and the error was on the part of the service provider rather than the true
party in interest with respect to privacy, the subscriber or customer.
Thus, I argue that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in once-
public, now deleted social media content. Would it then be appropriate to
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant to access all such content? I
think that might be appropriate where the content is very personal (e.g.,
health information), and it was only ever publicly accessible on account of
service provider mistake. But I do not think that would be ideal where the
content is less personal and was intentionally made publicly available by
the user. So finding a reasonable expectation of privacy is only half the
battle (if that). According to the Fourth Amendment, all government ac-
cess must be reasonable, and a warrant can only issue upon probable cause.
But the Amendment does not dictate that reasonable access must always
be via a warrant.
A court might have to confront this-and other-difficult issues as a
matter of Fourth Amendment law, but it would be much better for a legis-
lature to make an initial attempt. Daniel Solove has explained that:
84. See Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 Miss. L.J. 139,
185-86 (2005); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-
Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1011-1012 (2007)
(expounding on Slobogin's principle); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000). This same reasoning applies to content previously disclosed to only a limited number of
persons.
85. My thanks to Christopher Slobogin for suggesting this analogy.
86. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data (General Data Protection Regulation) of 29 Nov. 2011, EPIC.ORG, art. 15 at 47-48, http://epic.
org/privacy/intl/EU-Privacy-Regulation-29-11-2011.pdf (last visited May 15, 2012).
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In an ideal world, government information gathering would
be regulated by a comprehensive statutory regime. Courts
would analyze whether the rules in this statutory regime
met basic Fourth Amendment principles rather than craft
the rules themselves. A pronouncement as short and vague
as the Fourth Amendment best serves as a guidepost to
evaluate rules, rather than as a source of those rules."
This does not mean, however, that a court can dodge its constitutional
responsibility if a legislature has failed to act. Solove continues:
But a comprehensive statutory regime to regulate govern-
ment information gathering does not yet exist. Statutes reg-
ulate government information gathering in isolated areas,
but there is no all-inclusive regime. For better or worse, the
Fourth Amendment has been thrust into the role of the pri-
mary regulatory system of government information gather-
ing. Until there is a substitute, we should treat the Fourth
Amendment as the regulatory system it has been tasked
with being. If legislatures respond with rules of their own,
courts should shift from crafting the rules to evaluating the
rules made by legislatures. 88
Justice Alito, writing in concurrence for himself and three others,
made much the same point in United States v. Jones:
In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best so-
lution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.
To date, however, Congress and most States have not enacted statutes
regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement pur-
poses. The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a par-
ticular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would
not have anticipated.89
Ideally, statutes will govern access to social media information, which
statutes the courts will review for compliance with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. Not only can legislatures more consistently approach
the myriad of differing circumstances under which law enforcement ac-
cesses different types of information, but they can regulate the decisions of
private social media providers. Whereas the Fourth Amendment limits
only government conduct, and therefore places no limitation on disclosure
87. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2010).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
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by private entities on their own initiative, statutes can thoughtfully regulate
both.
IV. STATUTES AND SOCIAL MEDIA
As to legislation regulating law enforcement access to social media in-
formation, we are as unlucky as a person in luck could be. We are in luck,
because there are such statutes, in particular three federal laws: the Wire-
tap Act (Title III),90 the Pen Trap Act,"' and the Stored Communications
Act.92 We are unlucky, because when it comes to modern communications
like social media, they are real dogs. The technologies and norms of social
media have evolved rapidly, whereas the statutory structure-and much of
the particular language-has remained constant. The Stored Communica-
tions Act ("SCA") was enacted in 1986, during the era of the Bulletin
Board System.93 The World Wide Web did not yet exist; it would be pro-
posed in late 1990. And despite several rounds of amendments, the basic
structure of the SCA has remained static.
The distribution of work between the three statutes is fairly clear if,
remarkably, it has to be inferred in the case of the Wiretap Act.9 4 If the
issue is one cf prospective, real time surveillance, then the place to look is
the Wiretap Act for the contents of communications and the Pen Trap Act
for non-content "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information." 95
If the issue is retrospective, historic surveillance, then the place to look is
the Stored Communications Act. So if law enforcement wants to obtain
Facebook wall posts or messages or Twitter tweets as you send or receive
them, it is a Wiretap Act issue. If law enforcement wants to obtain that
same information later via Facebook or Twitter records, it is a Stored Com-
munications Act issue.
90. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communica-
tions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
91. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
92. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2711 (2006).
93. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980-81 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (gather-
ing precedent applying the SCA to bulletin board systems).
94. The Wiretap Act governs "intercepts," where intercept is defined as "the aural or other ac-
quisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Since gaining possession or control can
constitute an "acquisition," it would seem that an Internet Service Provider faxing or emailing content
in response to a Title III warrant could constitute an "intercept." Courts interpret the statute, however,
to regulate only acquisition contemporaneous with its transmission. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Every circuit court to have considered the matter has held
that an 'intercept' . . . must occur contemporaneously with transmission."). Where the technology of
the Internet, with its store and forward router delay, has potentially caused this to be less clear, courts
have taken a practical interpretation rather than an overly technical one. See, e.g., United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (finding provider's automatic forwarding of e-
mail to constitute an intercept); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133,1136-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding use of screen capture spyware on a home computer to constitute an intercept under an analo-
gous Florida provision).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(8), 2511(1)(c).
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As a matter of privacy, this distinction makes no sense. Nowhere in
the theory of information privacy as control over information is there a
temporal limitation. Somebody who considers their Facebook messages to
be private wants to control the messages dissemination as they are sent, the
next day, the next week, and the next year. The right and ability to control
what information about you is conveyed to others and for what purposes
does not diminish in value over time. Indeed, in at least some instances the
privacy interest may be greatest with respect to very old information that
would be especially harmful given its lack of context and current relevance.
As discussed above, it is privacy that allows us to mature and develop, and
that ability is threatened by the "outing" of former selves. Hence, properly
interpreted, the Fourth Amendment recognizes no such temporal differ-
ence. Unfortunately, the current statutory framework does.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit has held unconstitutional a provision of the
Stored Communications Act that poorly protects the privacy of stored e-
mail communications, 96 and many have called for increasing the relatively
weak protections provided to historic information.9 7 Moreover, the statu-
tory protections depend upon confusing and often unhelpful distinctions
such as whether information is deemed to be in "electronic storage,"98
which is defined in a far from common-sense manner,99 and whether a pro-
vider is an "electronic communication service" or "remote computing ser-
vice." 10 As to opened Gmail (Google email), for example, Google might
be neither since the provider accesses content to deliver targeted
advertising.o0
As for disclosure on private initiative, meaning without government
involvement, employers and other service providers that do not provide
service "to the public" are entirely unrestrained.' 0 2 Since social media sites
are available to all comers-meaning they do provide service "to the pub-
lic"-they typically cannot disclose posts, tweets, and chats on pain of civil
liability, including not being permitted to respond to civil subpoenas re-
questing such contents. 03  They face no similar restraint on disclosing
96. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283-88 (6th Cir. 2010).
97. See, e.g., Cell Phone Location, supra note 78; First Principles, supra note 78; Lerner & Mulli-
gan, supra note 78; Slobogin, supra note 84; Strandburg, supra note 78.
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
100. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)-(b). Many will also fault the Stored Communications Act for fail-
ing to have a suppression remedy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708. Even the Wiretap Act lacks a suppression
remedy for intercepted "electronic communications." See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (providing suppression only
for "oral" and "wire" communications). But suppression of evidence is always controversial, even for
constitutional violations. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 354-366 (5th ed. 2010).
101. Seel8 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (providing a temporal limitation on "electronic storage"); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b)(2)(B) (limiting protection to information held or maintained "solely for the purpose of pro-
viding storage or computer processing services.").
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (only restricting those providing service "to the public").
103. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)-(b); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 976-91
(C.D. Cal. 2010); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, L.L.C., 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609-12 (E.D. Va.
2008); May I Obtain Contents of a User's Account from Facebook Using a Civil Subpoena?, FACEBOOK,
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transactional and subscriber information to anyone other than the
government.1 04
While these specific statutes are entirely too confusing and require
substantive reform, legislatures would also benefit from a greater perspec-
tive. Sectoral, content-specific regulations make sense, but they should be
considered under a larger umbrella that promotes consistent and thought-
ful regulation. Surely there are principles that are applicable whether a
legislature is considering law enforcement access to bank records, social
media records, or medical records. Rather than proceed in an entirely ad
hoc fashion, decision makers should begin with a set of first principles that
provide a framework for producing sensible and consistent sectoral
legislation.
For five years, I have been part of an effort to develop such a frame-
work, the first of its kind, and on February 6, 2012, the American Bar Asso-
ciation House of Delegates adopted our black letter standards on Law
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records."os They will be published
with detailed commentary, and hopefully much more will be written about
them elsewhere. It is a very positive initial step. We now have a frame-
work courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies can use in making the
difficult determinations of how best to regulate law enforcement access to
information in order to account for the needs of law enforcement and the
interests of privacy, freedom of expression, and social participation.
V. CONcLusIoN
As is typically the case, social media is not as novel as many think it to
be. Its computer origins stretch back as long as several decades, and-as
the original moniker of "bulletin board systems" makes clear-its offline
equivalents extend far beyond that. It is nonetheless remarkable that a
seventh of the world's population might soon be using a single online social
media resource, and the amount of information that resides with third
party social media providers is expanding dramatically, along with other
types of third party information. Since information privacy is a fundamen-
tal principle of human development and dignity that has been acknowl-
edged by all modern democracies, thoughtful and careful regulation of
government access is a critical issue. On the one hand, access to such
http://www.facebook.com/help/search/?q=civil+subpoenas (last visited May 15, 2012). The Stored Com-
munications Act has no bearing on access to emails residing on a personal computer and further does
not prevent a court from ordering a party to litigation to either (1) him or herself request the informa-
tion from his or her service provider, thereby falling under a § 2702(b) consent exception, or (2) pro-
vide his or her login information, such that an opposing party can look at the site. So long as the
requested information is relevant, courts in civil discovery adopt one of these options. See, e.g., Largent
v. Reed, No. 2009-1823 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Nov. 7, 2011) (requiring plaintiff to disclose login information and
to not change it for 21 days thereafter), available at http://www.theemployerhandbook.com/.pdf; Thayer
v. Chiczewski, 2009 WL 2957317, at *67 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2009) (relying on party consent).
104. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(3), (c)(6).
105. See Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/policy/standards/lawenforcement-access.html
(last visited May 15, 2012).
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records is necessary not only for the prevention and detection of traditional
crimes but also to prevent and detect private access that is itself harmful,
such as identity theft and computer hacking. On the other hand, law en-
forcement access implicates information privacy and American norms of
limited government and principles of freedom of speech and association.
Fortunately, even with the unfortunate-and hopefully temporary-
limitations of the Fourth Amendment third party doctrine, there is consti-
tutional privacy protection for social media contents that are not dissemi-
nated to the public. Constitutional protection of transactional information,
however, does require reformulating that doctrine. This should be both a
constitutional and legislative priority, because just as one reasonably ex-
pects privacy in telephone dialing records, one reasonably expects privacy
in online transactional information such as the Internet protocol addresses
involved in Web browsing and in records pertaining to online communica-
tions. Scholars have noted and considered the protection of such informa-
tion under the First Amendment's freedom of associationto6 and courts
have recognized that such First Amendment rights should inform the ex-
pectation of privacy analysis.o0
There will be reasoned disagreements on precisely what restrictions
should be required before law enforcement can access particular informa-
tion, resulting in different rules in different jurisdictions. Subject to a fed-
eral constitutional floor, this makes good sense and is to be encouraged.
But rather than rely entirely upon ad hoc sectoral consideration, legisla-
tures and other decision makers can use the framework provided by the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third
Party Records to coherently regulate access to different types of third party
information, including social media information.
106. See Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs.
Data Empowerment _ N.C. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2012); Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of Associ-
ation in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV.
741 (2008).
107. See, e.g., Amazon.com, L.L.C. v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (rejecting
government subpoena of expressive records); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible Violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1461, 706 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16-23 (D.D.C. 2009) (same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Ama-
zon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246 F.R.D. 570, 572-74 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (same). For other sources
courts look to in finding a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy, see Timely Demise,
supra note 79, at 42 n.26.
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